On Lilly Ledbetter\u27s Liberty: Why Equal Pay for Equal Work Remains an Elusive Reality by Putnam, Katie
William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law
Volume 15 | Issue 3 Article 7
On Lilly Ledbetter's Liberty: Why Equal Pay for
Equal Work Remains an Elusive Reality
Katie Putnam
Copyright c 2009 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl
Repository Citation
Katie Putnam, On Lilly Ledbetter's Liberty: Why Equal Pay for Equal Work Remains an Elusive Reality,
15 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 685 (2009), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmjowl/vol15/iss3/7
ON LILLY LEDBETTER'S LIBERTY: WHY EQUAL PAY FOR
EQUAL WORK REMAINS AN ELUSIVE REALITY
ABSTRACT
On January 29, 2009, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act became
the first bill signed into law by President Barack Obama. It reverses
the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. by expanding the time in which a plaintiff claiming pay
discrimination can bring suit. This Note argues that Ledbetter was
wrongly decided, scrutinizes the legislation drafted to overturn the
holding, and compares alternative solutions, such as the use of a dis-
covery rule, equitable doctrines, or legislation that would strengthen
the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to ensure
that employees are truly protected by Title VII. A 2003 Department
of Labor study revealed that women continue' to earn seventy-eight
percent of what men earn. The disparity will not disappear soon, and
for that reason, the story of female worker turned feminist heroine,
Lilly Ledbetter, must be told, shared, and considered.
I. LILLY LEDBETTER'S STORY
A. The Facts
B. Procedural History




V. WHY DOES THIS DECISION MATTER?
VI. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
A. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
B. The Lesson from Lorance
VII. EQUITABLE DOCTRINES
A. Waiver, Equitable Tolling, Estoppel, Defense of Laches
B. The Discovery Rule
C. Massachusetts's Experience
VIII. FORTIFYING THE ROLE OF THE EEOC
A. Chevron Deference and Arabian Respect
IX. PAYCHECKS AS PROPERTY AND ON LIBERTY
CONCLUSION
By a one Justice margin on the United States Supreme Court,
Lilly Ledbetter lost her Title VII sex-based pay discrimination claim
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against Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company on May 29, 2007. In
a five to four decision written by Justice Alito, the Court held that
Ledbetter's claim was untimely because it relied on an intentional dis-
criminatory pay decision that occurred outside of the 180-day charg-
ing period for Title VII claims.2 Protesting this strict interpretation
of the Title VII statute of limitations, Justice Ginsburg read her dis-
sent from the bench.3 The isolation of Ginsburg's voice, "as precise
and emotionless as if she were reading a banking decision,"4 evoked
an undeniable kinship between the lone female Supreme Court Justice
and Lilly Ledbetter, the lone female area manager, who earned $559
less per month than the lowest paid male area manager and $1509
less per month than the highest paid area manager.5 Ginsburg and
Ledbetter, however, were not alone in their interpretation of Supreme
Court precedent.6 Taking up Ledbetter's side, Ginsburg argued that
precedent established a "paycheck accrual rule," permitting pay-
checks that were not issued with discriminatory intent to satisfy the
statute of limitations articulated in the Title VII enforcement provi-
sions for the purpose of bringing a Title VII claim.7 Furthermore, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), a federal
agency created by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enforce the pro-
visions of Title VII,' filed an amicus brief in support of Ledbetter
1. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by
statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
2. Id. at 621; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000) (stating that claimant has 180 days
after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred to file a charge).
3. Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg's Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, WASH. POST,
May 30, 2007, at A01 ('CThe decision moved Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to read a dissent
from the bench, a usually rare practice that she has now employed twice in the past six
weeks to criticize the majority for opinions that she said undermine women's rights.").
4. Id.
5. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. Numerous activist groups filed amicus briefs on behalf of Lilly Ledbetter. See
Brief for the National Employment Lawyers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618 (No. 05-1074); Brief for the National Partnership for
Women & Families et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618
(No. 05-1074).
7. The majority and dissenting Justices in Ledbetter battled over whether the holding
in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986), articulated the paycheck accrual rule. See
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 633-35; id. at 646-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Lower courts and
Justice Ginsburg extrapolated the paycheck accrual rule from dicta in Justice Brennan's
opinion in Bazemore: "Each week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a simi-
larly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII." Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395;
see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000) ("A charge under this section shall be filed within one
hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred."). In
some jurisdictions the period is 300 days but this Note will use the 180-day period because
that was the applicable period in Ledbetter. See § 2000e-5(e)(1).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241, 258-59 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2000)) (creating the EEOC).
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when the case was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. In the EEOC's
Compliance Manual, the agency articulated its position that "'re-
peated occurrences of the same discriminatory employment action,
such as discriminatory paychecks, can be challenged as long as one
discriminatory act occurred within the charge filing period."" 0
The controversy that framed the Ledbetter case en route to the
Supreme Court was inflamed by the Court's decision." The United
States Congress responded to the decision and Ginsburg's call -
"[o]nce again, the ball is in Congress' court" 2 - quickly. 3 The House
of Representatives voted on and passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act,'4 but the parallel legislation on the Senate side was blocked by
Republican senators in April 2008."5 Unsurprisingly, President George
Bush vowed to veto the legislation, which would be the first attempt
by Congress to overrule a decision from Chief Justice John Roberts's
Court.'6 With the election of President Barack Obama, the bill was re-
introduced in January 2009.17 The House of Representatives passed
the bill by a vote of 247 to 171 on January 9, 2009,18 and the Senate
9. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 656 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Brief of EEOC
Supporting Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc, Ledbetter v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-15264)).
10. Id. (citing 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 2-IV-C(1)(a) (2006)).
11. See, e.g., Richard Thompson Ford, Bad Think: The Supreme Court Mixes up
Intending to Screw over Your Employee and Actually Doing It, SLATE, May 30, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2167286 (characterizing the Ledbetter decision as misguided);
Supreme Court Sides with Business in Wage Sex Discrimination Case, FEMINIST DAILY
NEWS WIRE, May 30,2007, http://feminist.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=10336
("Not only does the ruling ignore the reality of pay discrimination, it also cripples the
law's intent to address it, and undermines the incentive for employers to prevent and
correct it.") (quoting Marcia Greenberger of the National Women's Law Center).
12. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. See Robert Barnes, Exhibit A in Painting Court as Too Far Right, WASH. POST,
Sept. 5, 2007, at A19 ('Three Democratic presidential candidates have signed on to Senate
legislation [the Fair Pay Restoration Act] that would overturn the court's decision. The
House already has acted, approving the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act on July 31. The
American Bar Association passed a resolution supporting Ledbetter and the legislation
at its convention last month."); Ledbetter Testifies in House Hearing; Committee Calls
for Title VI Action, FEMINIST DAILY NEWS WIRE, June 13, 2007, http://feminist.org/news/
newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=10362 (discussing Ledbetter's June 12,2007 testimony before
the House Committee on Education and Labor).
14. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007, H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (as passed by House,
July 31, 2007).
15. Fair Pay Restoration Act, S. 1843, 110th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate,
July 20,2007); Carl Hulse, Republican Senators Block Pay Discrimination Measure, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04I24/washington/24cong
.html?_r=3&sq=&oref-slogin.
16. Barnes, supra note 13, at A19.
17. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, H.R. 11, 111th Cong.; Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act of 2009, S. 181, 111th Cong.
18. Robert Pear, House Passes 2 Measures on Job Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/10/us/l0rights.html?hp.
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passed the bill two weeks later by a vote of sixty-one to thirty-six.19
On January 29, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act became the first piece
of legislation signed by President Obama.2 ° While Lilly Ledbetter has
vindicated the rights of many female workers for generations to come,
it is still important to examine why the Supreme Court got this one
wrong in the first place and to look at alternative solutions to the
passage of legislation targeting the specific holding of the case be-
cause, as Ledbetter has shown, effecting change through legislation
can take far too long because legislatures are vulnerable to political
tides and elections.
Ledbetter is particularly remarkable2' because an individual
rights claim was resolved against the plaintiff in the Supreme Court
on procedural grounds.22 The simplicity of the issues and facts in the
case coupled with the socio-political and historical importance of
employment discrimination law have generated a natural platform
to discuss whether the federal government should continue to afford
plaintiff-workers significant protection under the Civil Rights Law
of 1964 after over forty years of litigation. The Ledbetter case in-
volves sex discrimination, but as Justice Ginsburg underscored in the
dissent, Title VII decisions apply to all the protected classes listed
therein, including race, religion, and national origin.23 Lilly Ledbetter,
then, is only one person within a class of prospective plaintiffs who
were vulnerable to the denial of relief for actual pay discrimination
before President Obama signed the bill.24
This Note compares the approaches of the majority and dissenting
opinions in Ledbetter in terms of statutory interpretation, handling
19. Shailagh Murray, Fair-Wage Bill Clears the Senate: High Court Decision Would
Be Overturned, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2009, at A4 ("[A]ll 16 female senators voted in favor
of the measure ....).
20. Richard Leiby, A Signature with the First Lady's Hand in It, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,
2009, at C 1 (noting that Michelle Obama, specifically, has championed Lilly Ledbetter's
cause).
21. See, e.g., Editorial, Injustice 5, Justice 4, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A18-19 ('The
Supreme Court struck a blow for discrimination this week by stripping a key civil rights
law of much of its potency."). But see, e.g., Posting of Ted Frank to Justice Talking, http:I
communities.justicetalking.org/blogs/day4/archive/2008/02/04/the-ledbetter-case.aspx
(Feb. 4, 2008, 00:02 EST) ("This should be noncontroversial.").
22. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 632 (2007), superseded
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
23. Id. at 658 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (mentioning age and disability, which are not
protected by Title VII, but other civil rights laws, the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 ("ADEA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), as classes
who may have less protection post-Ledbetter).
24. But see Nancy Zisk, In the Wake of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company:
Applying the Discovery Rule to Determine the Start of the Limitations Period for Pay
Discrimination Claims, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoLy 137, 138 (2009) (arguing that the
Ledbetter decision may be limited to its "very specific facts").
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of precedent, and understanding of congressional intent. It argues
that Ledbetter was wrongly decided because paychecks constitute
property; as such, a discovery rule or equitable tolling would be more
appropriate doctrines to use than intent to determine when litigation
is reasonably initiated in this context. By reviewing the majority's
reasoning, the Note scrutinizes the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and
similar legislation drafted by the California Legislature to determine
if it adequately articulates the "paycheck accrual rule" and clarifies
the language of Title VII. Finally, the Note submits that a statutory
amendment strengthening the role of the EEOC in the statutory in-
terpretation of Title VII would anchor judicial decisions to the gen-
eral public's understanding of how Title VII works and avoid strained
interpretations exemplified by decisions like Ledbetter.
I. LILLY LEDBETTER'S STORY
A. The Facts
Lilly Ledbetter worked at the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Plant in
Gadsen, Alabama from 1979 until 1998 when she retired.25 Ledbetter
was the only woman who held the position of area manager; the other
fifteen managers were men.26 According to one source, Ledbetter re-
ceived an anonymous letter relating that she was making less than
her male co-workers with similar experience and positions.27 In July
1998, Ledbetter filed a formal charge of sex discrimination with the
EEOC.28 Ledbetter filed her complaint alleging pay discrimination
based on sex under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA")
in November 1998.29
B. Procedural History
A jury sitting in the Northern District of Georgia awarded Led-
better $223,776 in back pay (which the court reduced to $60,00030),
25. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621.
26. Id. at 643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
27. Valerie Dowdle, Ledbetter, Lilly v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., ON THE DOCKET,
May 29,2007, http://otd.oyez.orgarticles/2007/05/29/ledbetter-lilly-v-goodyear-tire-rubber-
co-05292007 ("[B]y 1998, when the anonymous note turned up ... she was being paid
less than all her male counterparts in the tire assembly department, even recent hires with
far less on-the-job experience.").
28. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621.
29. Id.; see 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2000) (limiting damages for back pay to two years
prior to the date starting the EEOC charging period).
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$4662 for mental anguish, and $3,285,979 in punitive damages
(which the court reduced to $295,338 to bring the total damages
awarded within the statutory limitations under Title V11
31).32
On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, the defendant argued that
Ledbetter's claim was time-barred by the statute of limitations,
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2000), and the court agreed.33
Ledbetter filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court
to resolve the statute of limitations issue for Title VII pay discrimi-
nation claims.34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
circuit court split on this question.35
II. INTENT IS THE PRIMARY ELEMENT IN A TITLE VII DISPARATE
TREATMENT CLAIM
Title VII defines an "unlawful employment practice" to include
discrimination against an individual with respect to compensation
because of the individual's membership in one of five protected
classes: race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.36 Plaintiffs may
bring either a disparate treatment or a disparate impact claim under
Title VII.37 Ledbetter claimed disparate treatment.31 In a disparate
treatment case, the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to sup-
port an inference that the differential treatment resulting from an
employment decision was rooted in discriminatory intent.3 Under
Title VII, the plaintiff almost always bears the burden of persuasion
on the element of discriminatory intent.40 Ultimately, the two ele-
ments of Ledbetter's claim were "an employment practice[] and dis-
criminatory intent."4'
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000). It is important to note that the district court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the EPA claim, which thereby
limited the scope of appellate review (and the holdings in the court of appeals and the
Supreme Court) to the Title VII claim. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 622,640. In fact, Justice Alito
argues that Ledbetter could have pursued her claim under the EPA and avoided the
statute of limitations issue altogether. Id. at 640.
32. Brief for the Petitioner on Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit at 9, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 421 F.3d 1169
(11th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-15264).
33. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 622-23.
34. Id.
35. Compare Ledbetter, 421 F.3d 1169, with Forsyth v. Fed'n Empl. & Guidance Serv.,
409 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2005), and Shea v. Rice, 409 F.3d 448 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
37. SusAN M. OMILIAN & JEAN P. KAMP, 1 SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DIScRIMINATION
§ 11:10 (2008), available at 1 SBEDIS 11:10 (Westlaw).
38. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 624.
39. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977) (discussing the
relevance of the holding in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
40. Fallon v. Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1989).
41. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 624. While discriminatory intent is the main element in a
Title VII case concerning disparate pay, a plaintiff bringing a claim under the EPA does
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Paychecks pose a specific problem to proving present intent be-
cause, as Ledbetter argued, although the paychecks issued during the
statute of limitations period in her case did not result from inten-
tional discrimination that occurred during the 180-day period, the pay-
checks within the period are actionable because they "'implement[]
a prior discriminatory decision."' 42 Under this view, the paychecks
are tainted with the intentionally discriminatory pay decision.4"
Ledbetter's argument that paychecks are actionable in spite of a
lack of present discriminatory intent was grounded in the generally-
accepted "paycheck accrual rule."" This rule finds its source in dicta
in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Bazemore v. Friday.45
III. BAZEMORE
In Bazemore, the plaintiffs challenged the persistence of a
pre-Title VII payment system that paid white employees more than
similarly situated black employees.4" Though the North Carolina
Agricultural Extension Service had taken some steps to cure the
discrimination after Title VII became effective, it admitted that the
discrimination had not been eliminated.47 The Supreme Court held
that liability could be imposed for discrimination that. "perpetuated
after 1972." 4 Justice Ginsburg relied on language in the Bazemore
opinion to locate the case's association with the "paycheck accrual
rule":49 "[e] ach week's paycheck that delivers less to a black than
to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII,
regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effec-
tive date of Title VII."' 0 Though a plain reading of this statement
not have to prove intent. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2006) (prohibiting sex discrimination
by employers in payment of wages but not requiring proof of intent). To make out a prima
facie case under the EPA, the "plaintiff must prove that two workers of opposite sex (1) in
the same 'establishment' are (2) receiving unequal pay (3) 'on the basis of sex' (4) for
work that is 'equal."' MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 574 (6th ed. 2003). Because the elements do not correlate under Title VII
and EPA, the circuits are split on the issue of whether the EPA burdens must be applied
in a Title VII sex-based pay discrimination case. Id. at 575. 1 will discuss the implications
of this issue in relation to Justice Alito's emphasis on the EPA as an adequate alternative
for Ledbetter. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
42. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 625 (quoting Reply Brief for Petitioner at 20).
43. Id. at 646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("[E]ach payment of a wage or salary infected
by sex-based discrimination constitutes an unlawful employment practice...
44. Id. at 633.
45. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1986) (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 394-95.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 395.
49. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 633 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
50. Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395.
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clearly renders paychecks actionable that result from an earlier dis-
criminatory regime, Justice Alito's opinion in Ledbetter distinguished
Bazemore by arguing that it was only meant to apply to cases where
an employer institutes a pay system that discriminates on its face.51
Justice Alito read this distinction into Bazemore and reinforced
it by arguing that "intentionally" maintaining a facially discrimi-
natory policy satisfies the intent element.52 Ironically, a "facially
discriminatory pay structure" " more closely resembles a discrete un-
lawful employment practice than an individual pay decision (made
behind closed doors) because facial policies and discrete decisions are
easier for an employee to detect; they are more public and therefore
more obvious.54 Logically, it seems the more subtle discrimination
should be subject to the exception created by Bazemore. To the extent
Bazemore is vulnerable to competing interpretations, the majority in
Ledbetter relied on a more recent case, National Railroad Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, that purports to answer "whether, and under what
circumstances, a Title VII plaintiff may file suit on events that fall
outside this statutory time period."55
IV. MORGAN
Justice Thomas, writing the majority opinion in Morgan, held
that "unlawful employment practice [s]" that are "discrete" 6 discrim-
inatory acts are subject to the timeliness provision of Title VII.57 Acts
may still be "discrete" notwithstanding their connection to other acts.5
The decision distinguishes "discrete" acts from "hostile work environ-
ment" claims and holds further that in the hostile work environment
setting, any act that is part of the series of acts that combine to create
a hostile environment occurring within the 180-day charging period
render defendant liable for all of the acts creating the environment. 9
The Morgan opinion plays a significant role in the Ledbetter
discussion. The dissent in Ledbetter uses the Morgan definition of
51. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 634-35.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Zisk, supra note 24, at 137-45.
55. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002).
56. Id. at 111-13 (citing cases containing examples of discrete discriminatory acts
provided in the opinion including: Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229
(1976) (holding discharge date, rather than conclusion of grievance proceedings, to be a
discrete discriminatory act); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977) (holding
resignation a discrete discriminatory act); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980)
(holding denial of tenure a discrete discriminatory act)).
57. Id. at 113.
58. Id. at 111.
59. Id. at 118.
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a hostile work environment to illustrate its similarities to pay dis-
crimination claims rather than "discrete" acts.' The argument is not
a strong one, but the majority's use of the Morgan opinion is equally
flawed.
Much of the majority's support for the holding relies on the de-
velopment of precedent that supposedly applies to the Ledbetter case.6'
Justice Alito plucks two cases that Justice Thomas used in Morgan
to offer examples of "discrete discrimination." 62 The comparison of
the issuance of paychecks to cases where the plaintiffs were either
forced to resign or denied tenure is feeble. The plaintiffs in Evans and
Ricks can specify the date on which their employers made decisions
tainted with discriminatory animus which left them in a undeniably
worse position.' Lilly Ledbetter, conversely, cannot identify the exact
date when her salary started losing ground against her male counter-
parts.' As Justice Ginsburg observed, "[i]t is only when the disparity
becomes apparent and sizable.., that an employee in Ledbetter's
situation is likely to comprehend her plight and ... complain." 65
Ultimately, Morgan did not provide an answer to the specific
question in Ledbetter. In 2002 the Court did not explicitly categorize
pay discrimination.' In fact, it is absent from the shortlist of "discrete
acts" - among Thomas' "easy to identify" examples are "termination,
failure to promote, denial of transfer, [and] refusal to hire." 67
V. WHY DOES THIS DECISION MATTER?
The elemental importance of individual liberty underpins the
Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States.68 The Civil
60. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 647-48 (2007) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
61. Id. at 625-28.
62. Id. at 625-26 (discussing Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, and Evans, 431 U.S. 553).
63. See Ricks, 449 U.S. at 250 ("[Ihe only unlawful employment practice alleged was
the College's decision to deny respondent tenure, and that the limitations periods for both
claims had commenced to run by June 26, 1974, when the Board officially notified him
that he would be offered a 1-year 'terminal' contract.'); Evans, 431 U.S. at 554 ("During
respondent's initial period of employment, United maintained a policy of refusing to allow
its female flight attendants to be married. When she married in 1968, she was therefore
forced to resign.") (footnote omitted).
64. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19-20, Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618 (No. 05-1074)
('[Ledbetter] did get a higher raise that year [1995] and that was [her supervisor's] testi-
mony. He also testified that he had told her.., that she had done a very good job that
year and that's why she had gotten it, and the jury was entitled to believe that.').
65. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645.
66. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111-12 (2002) (discussing
Bazemore in dicta as a "pattern-or-practice" case that can be understood in terms of
"discrete" acts).
67. Id. at 114.
68. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
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Rights Act of 196469 is an essential outgrowth of the foundational
emphasis on individual liberty, and Title VII was conceived as a
broad proscription against subtle and overt discrimination in all
workplaces."0 Lilly Ledbetter's situation is a clear example of the
insidiousness of subtle discrimination. Title VII has been effective
for over forty years, and yet sex discrimination persists.' Indeed, a
2003 Department of Labor study showed that women earn seventy-
eight percent of what men earn.72
According to one estimate, 40,000 pay discrimination cases were
filed in the five-year period from 2001 to 2006.73 The article argued
that "many" of the pay discrimination cases brought under Title VII
would be barred post-Ledbetter.4 Yet the ultimate impact of Ledbetter
on female plaintiffs bringing sex discrimination claims was (luckily)
dampened significantly by the Equal Pay Act of 1963 ("EPA").75
According to Justice Alito, Lilly Ledbetter lost her case because
she "abandoned" her EPA claim after a magistrate judge dismissed
the claim. 76 Though the EPA and Title VII have been construed iden-
tically because both seek to root out sex-based pay discrimination,
the EPA is much more narrow, focusing exclusively on sex discrimi-
nation and pay differences. 77 The EPA cures the problems identified
in Ledbetter because it does not require a showing of intent 7 and
69. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d,
2000a to h-6 (2000).
70. 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (Clark-Case Memorandum); see Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561,581 n.14 (1984) (adopting the opinions in the memo-
randum prepared by Senators Clark and Case on Title VII as "authoritative"); Chad
Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and
the Return of 'No Case'Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1198 (2003) (discussing the
Clark-Case Memorandum); see also Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 660-61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
('This is not the first time the Court has ordered a cramped interpretation of Title VII,
incompatible with the statute's broad remedial purpose.").
71. In fact, the Department of Labor recently won a $925,000 settlement for 800
female workers in a separate sex discrimination suit against Goodyear related to hiring
practices at its Danville, Virginia plant between 1998 and 1999. Goodyear Settles Second
Gender Discrimination Case, FEMINIST DAILY NEWS WIRE, Jan. 22, 2007, http://feminist
.org/news/newsbyte/uswirestory.asp?id=10104.
72. Kate Lorenz, Equal Pay for Women? Not Till 2050, CNN.cOM, Dec. 20, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004IUS/Careers/10/22/equal.pay/index.html ("At the current rate
of change, working women will not achieve equal pay until after the year 2050.").
73. Linda Greenhouse, Justices'Ruling Limits Lawsuits on Pay Disparity, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2007, at Al.
74. Id.
75. Equal Pay Act of 1964, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
76. See Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 640 n.9; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 64, at 8 ("The district court held that there were fact disputes that precluded that
conclusion, but for some reason only reinstated the Title VII claim.").
77. 45A AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 626 (2002).
78. Id.
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does not have a statute of limitations.79 To make out a prima facie
case, a plaintiff shows simply that she is doing equivalent work, but
receiving less than a male employee.' In this respect, proving an
EPA claim is easier than a Title VII claim, but Title VII claims may
proceed without a "comparison employee" to demonstrate the wage
differential.81
The EPA clearly provides an alternative path for some Ledbetter-
like plaintiffs. In fact, plaintiffs who can bring an EPA claim should;
EPA claims favor plaintiffs, while Title VII claims favor defendants.82
By using a procedural tool to further limit plaintiffs' protection, ironi-
cally, the Court bolstered an already defendant-friendly statute.
The EPA did not, however, provide recourse for all claims poten-
tially barred by Ledbetter. For example, Title VII and the EPA do not
cover all of the same private employers. Any employer subject to only
Title VII liability was immunized against old claims by Ledbetter.
Furthermore, at least one article argues that Title VII may preempt
discrimination cases under Title IX 4 in the education sector.85 To
the extent Ledbetter effectively eliminated a subset of sex discrimi-
nation claims, and endangered other employment discrimination
claims based on race, national origin, disability, and age, it is impor-
tant to consider whether the legislation recently signed by President
Obama effectively responds to and neutralizes the Ledbetter holding.
VI. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
A. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 8
The House of Representatives introduced the Lilly Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act on June 22, 2007, less than a month after the Supreme
79. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
80. OMILIAN & KAMP, supra note 37, § 8:01 (2007).
81. 45A AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 626 (2002).
82. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 659 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) ("In practical effect, 'if the trier of fact is in equipoise about whether the wage
differential is motivated by gender discrimination,' Title VII compels a verdict for the
employer, while the EPA compels a verdict for the plaintiff." (quoting 2 C. SULLIVAN, M.
ZIMMER, & R. WHITE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW AN]) PRACTICE § 7.08 [F][3],
p.532 (3d ed. 2002))), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
83. 45A AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 626 (2002).
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (prohibiting sex discrimination in any education program
or activity receiving federal funding, including employment discrimination).
85. Douglas P. Ruth, Note, Title VII & Title X = ?: Is Title IX the Exclusive Remedy
for Employment Discrimination in the Educational Sector?, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY
185, 186 (1996) (arguing that Congress intended to preempt Title IX employment discrim-
ination actions with Title VII because of the lack of procedural safeguards in Title IX).
86. H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007).
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Court's decision." According to the House Report on the bill, the pur-
pose of the legislation was "to reverse the Supreme Court's May 29,
2007, ruling in Ledbetter v. Goodyear." ' The (now enacted) bill, how-
ever, also amends the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
("ADEA"), 89 the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), °
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973"' with respect to compensation
decisions.2 The key language amending the Civil Rights Act states:
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in viola-
tion of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision
or other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject
to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or
when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, including each time
wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole
or in part from such a decision or other practice. 3
The enacted bill formally adopts the paycheck accrual rule that
Congress found to be one of the "bedrock principles of American law
for decades." 94 Thus, the bill is narrowly tailored to the specific hold-
ing in Ledbetter, though it immunizes other similar civil rights laws
from the same procedural interpretation.
The legislative history of the Ledbetter bill was intensely politi-
cally charged.95 The first version passed in the House of Representa-
tives by a vote of 225 ayes, 199 nays.96 Speaker Nancy Pelosi praised
the passage of the bill: "the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act restores the
balance in the law and allows victims of wage discrimination to seek
justice in the courts."97 But divergent rhetoric was released by the
executive branch. Four days before the House vote, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) published its criticisms of the bill. 8
87. H.R. 2831 (as introduced by House, June 22, 2007).
88. H. REP. No. 110-237, at 3 (2007) (italics added).
89. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006).
90. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101-300 (2000).
91. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701-97 (2006).
92. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
93. § 3, 123 Stat. at 5-6.
94. § 2, 123 Stat. at 5.
95. Compare Press Release, Office of the Speaker of the House, Pelosi Statement on
Passage of Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (July 31, 2007), available at http://speaker.house.gov/
newsroompressreleases?id=0268, with Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Executive Office of the
President, Statement of Administration Policy, H.R. 2831 - Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2007 (July 27,2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-1/
hr2831sap-r.pdf.
96. 153 CONG. REC. H9226 (daily ed. July 31, 2007).
97. Press Release, Office of the Speaker of the House, supra note 95.
98. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 95.
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OMB's statement underscored the burdensomeness of stale claims
for defendant-employers and the court system and the traditional
rationales for statutes of limitations." It also argued that "the bill
far exceeds the stated purpose" because of the word choice: "compen-
sation decision or other practice." 00 OMB feared that the phrase,
"other practice," could be interpreted to mean not only salary set-
ting, but promotion or termination as well.1°' Setting the stage for
conflict, the OMB statement was unequivocal: 'If H.R. 2831 were pre-
sented to the President, his senior advisors would recommend that
he veto the bill."'1 2 While the threat of President Bush's veto is now
gone, the struggle behind the enactment of this legislation, as well
as similar California state legislation0 3 that was ultimately vetoed
by Governor Schwarznegger,'° 4 reveals the difficulty of relying on
this type of solution to an incorrect Supreme Court holding. The story
behind an earlier Title VII case, Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,
mentioned in the Ledbetter opinion further underscores the pitfalls
associated with drafting this type of recuperative legislation.'0 5
B. The Lesson from Lorance
In Lorance, the Supreme Court held untimely the plaintiffs'
EEOC charge alleging a discriminatory seniority system because the
adoption of the system constituted a discrete act that caused the
charging period to start running."° After Lorance, Congress amended
the timing provisions related to claims regarding seniority systems.'07
In spite of this clarification, Justice Alito employed the Lorance
99. See id.; see also Brant McLaughlin, Congress Passes Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
Assoc. CONTENT, Aug. 1, 2007, httpJ/www.associatedcontent.com/article/333067/congress
_passesjlilly-jedbetterfair.html (stating that the Bush administration opposed the bill
because it will benefit "lawyers, not American workers").
100. See Office of Mgmt & Budget, supra note 95; see also H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. § 3
(2007).
101. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 95.
102. Id.
103. Assemb. B. 437, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007). The California bill references
and explicitly rejects the Ledbetter interpretation and follows the federal legislation's draft-
ing of broad language - "compensation decision or other practice." Id.
104. California State Senate, Current Bill Status, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/
bill/asm/ab_0401-0450/ab_437_bill_20080930 history.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2009)
(showing that the bill was vetoed by the Governor on September 30, 2008).
105. Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1078-79.
106. Id. at 911. Lorance is a Title VII case where Congress, displeased with the outcome,
passed legislation amending Title VII to cover the specific fact pattern here. There may
be a lesson to be learned here because the legislative restraint in the Lorance situation
may not have sufficiently fortified Title VII against judicial attack.
107. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 112 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2)).
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decision as one of four cases which developed his precedent-based
argument that serves as the backbone reasoning for the Ledbetter
holding.'08 Looking at the statutory language, it is narrowly tailored
specifically to seniority systems alone.'0 s Thus, Justice Alito's inter-
pretation is not as cramped as it first appears. By comparing the
narrowly drafted post-Lorance legislation ("seniority system") with
the more expansive post-Ledbetter legislation ("other practice"), it
seems clear that the 11 1th Congress is using broader word choice to
accommodate more liberal judicial interpretations of congressional
intent. In the aftermath of Justice Alito's use of Lorance to defeat
Ledbetter's claim, the legislatures seem intent on giving courts less
discretion to render limited readings of Title VII amendments. Given
the vulnerability of the legislation to highly politicized maneuvering
or executive veto (California) and the risk of overly narrow drafting,
it is worth comparing alternative responses to Ledbetter.110 I now turn
to two legitimate, alternative remedies to Ledbetter: a judicial remedy
in the form of equitable doctrines and an administrative remedy in the
form of a stronger role for the EEOC. A third alternative, represent-
ing a purely academic response to Ledbetter, is a quasi-constitutional
approach.
VII. EQUITABLE DOCTRINES
A primary rationale underpinning the Ledbetter majority's deci-
sion not to treat each paycheck issued after the discriminatory deci-
sion as a discrete employment practice tainted with discriminatory
intent is sheltering defendant-employers from stale claims."' Justice
Ginsburg's response to this rationale underscored its redundancy in
108. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,626-27 (2007), superseded
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
109. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2) (2000) ("For purposes of this section, an un-
lawful employment practice occurs, with respect to a seniority system that has been
adopted for an intentionally discriminatory purpose in violation of this subchapter
(whether or not that discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority
provision), when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to
the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application of the
seniority system or provision of the system.") (emphasis added), with H.R. 2831, 110th
Cong. § 3(A) (2007) C'[A]n unlawful employment practice occurs.., when a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice is adopted, [or] when an individual becomes subject
to a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice ... ").
110. There is also a risk that the Supreme Court will narrowly construe the new legis-
lation. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, No. 07-543 (U.S. argued Dec. 10, 2008), will likely provide
the Court with the opportunity to respond to the new legislation. Kevin K. Russell, Esq.,
Howe & Russell, P.C., Address at the William & Mary School of Law: Ledbetter v.
Goodyear "Arguing for Pay Equality Before the Supreme Court" (Mar. 19, 2009).
111. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 630-31.
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light of the available equitable doctrines that provide employers with
ample protection against old claims." 2 With the Ledbetter holding
and access to equitable doctrines, defendant-employers now have
double-barreled protection. In the wake of this apparent tipping of the
scales, Speaker Nancy Pelosi's statement that the Ledbetter legisla-
tion "restores balance in the law" appeals to fairness and justice in its
assessment of the Ledbetter holding."3 The Ledbetter majority could
have applied any one of a number of equitable doctrines to the Title
VII pay discrimination setting, including equitable tolling, estoppel,
laches and the discovery rule.
A. Waiver, Equitable Tolling, Estoppel, Defense of Laches
The Title VII EEOC filing requirement is akin to a statute of
limitations and is therefore "subject to waiver, estoppel and equita-
ble tolling.""14 Equitable tolling saves a claim in spite of the fact that
it was filed outside of the 180-day period if the plaintiffs lateness is
excusable." 5 Waiver, the other side of the coin, finds the plaintiffs
procrastination inexcusable.' 6 Conversely, equitable estoppel is used
to stop "a party from taking unconscionable advantage of its own
wrong by asserting its strict legal rights."" 7
Equitable tolling and estoppel are only applied in extraordi-
nary circumstances where justice demands it." 8 Courts apply these
doctrines "with the utmost caution" and they are "not favored.""' 9
Moreover, they are difficult claims for plaintiffs to make out. To win
equitable estoppel against a party asserting a statute of limitations
defense, for example, the plaintiff must meet the clear and convincing
standard. 2 ° When applying equitable tolling, a court considers five
factors, including: "(1) lack of notice of the filing requirement; (2) lack
of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; (3) diligence in
pursuing one's rights; (4) absence of prejudice to the employer; and
(5) the employee's reasonableness in remaining ignorant of the par-
ticular legal requirement for filing his or her claim." 21 Thus, tolling
112. See id. at 658 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Doctrines such as 'waiver, estoppel, and
equitable tolling' 'allow us to honor Title VII's remedial purpose without negating the
particular purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer."
(quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002))).
113. See Press Release, Office of the Speaker of the House, supra note 95.
114. 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 1155 (Supp. 2008) (footnotes omitted).
115. Id.
116. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1580-81 (6th ed. 1990).
117. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 30 (Supp. 2008).
118. Id.; 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 1155 (Supp. 2008).
119. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 30 (Supp. 2008).
120. Id.
121. 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 1155 (Supp. 2008).
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and estoppel, which challenge plaintiffs to set forth reasonable ex-
planations for their delay in filing, sufficiently protect defendant-
employers against stale claims.
In addition, defendant-employers may raise the defense of laches
if they can show that the delay has put them at a disadvantage.122
Laches focuses on the plaintiff's reasonableness and is only available
to the defendant. 2 ' A successful laches defense bars awards for past
damages, but leaves available injunctive relief.'24
Because these doctrines result in balancing the plaintiffs and
defendant's rights and are only applied in cases where there is a true
risk of unfairness, Justice Ginsburg correctly assessed Justice Alito's
reasoning that employers need more protection as overstated. 125
B. The Discovery Rule
Another alternative to the paycheck accrual rule, deriving from
equitable concepts, is the discovery rule. 21 Under the discovery rule,
the statute of limitations does not start to run until the plaintiff dis-
covers the injury giving rise to the claim, usually because it is the
type of injury that is inherently difficult to detect. 27 Proponents of
the discovery rule argue that it more accurately reflects the practical
reality of discrimination on the ground: "[t]he messy reality of per-
ceiving gender bias contrasts sharply with the common assumption,
reflected in discrimination law, that a person's belief that she has
experienced discrimination is fixed and immediate." 21 Justice Alito
declined a discussion of the discovery rule in Ledbetter, but some have
interpreted footnote ten of the opinion as "leav[ing] the door open for
courts to sustain otherwise stale claims based on an assertion that
the circumstances of a particular case did not provide the claimant
122. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 39 (Supp. 2008).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,657 (2007) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
126. Id. at 642 n.10 (declining to discuss the discovery rule because Ledbetter did not
argue that it would change the outcome of her case). For an in-depth argument for the
application of a case-by-case discovery rule in pay discrimination cases, see Zisk, supra
note 24.
127. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 466 (6th ed. 1990).
128. Deborah L. Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psychological
Forces & Legal Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 679,681
(2007) (following her work on one of the amicus curiae briefs in Ledbetter, Brake wrote
this article discussing the social and psychological factors that complicate individuals'
ability to perceive gender discrimination when it occurs).
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with sufficient information to believe that discrimination occurred.""2
While it is unclear whether lower federal courts will interpret footnote
ten expansively, it is reassuring that state courts will not be bound
by Ledbetter. In fact, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
the state's court of last resort, applied the discovery rule in 2006 to
a case involving issues similar to Ledbetter.'30
C. Massachusetts's Experience
In Silvestris, two female teachers brought suit against their
employer under the Massachusetts laws that correlate to Title VII
and the EPA,13' alleging that "their starting salaries were set lower
than the starting salaries of male teachers ... because they were
given less credit for their prior work experience." 32 The plaintiffs won
at the trial court level, where the judge made a finding that defendant
"had engaged in wage discrimination." 33 As in Ledbetter, on appeal,
the defendant raised a statue of limitations defense.' As Justice
Ginsburg noted in Ledbetter, "[c]omparative pay information ... is
often hidden from the employee's view."'35 This was certainly true
in Silvestris, where the female teachers, whose salaries were set when
they were hired in 1993 and 1995, did not discuss starting salaries
with their male counterparts until a new male teacher was hired in
August 1998 and placed in a surprisingly high salary category." The
women pursued in-house grievance proceedings but they did not file
129. E.g., Posting of Donald R. Livingston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/
wp/what-comes-after-ledbetter-an-update (July 17, 2007, 15:39 EST).
130. Silvestris v. Tantasqua Reg'l Sch. Dist., 847 N.E.2d 328,336-38 (Mass. 2006); US.
Supreme Court Strictly Construes Statute of Limitations for Title VII Discrimination Cases,
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT ALERT (Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, Mass.), June 29, 2007, at
3, available at httpJ/www.goodwinprocter.com/-/media/9D047505E5134ECF9081A98620
FE883E.ashx.
131. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4(1) (West 2004) ("It shall be an unlawful
practice: 1. For an employer, by himself or his agent, because of the race, color, religious
creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation... or ancestry of any individual to refuse
to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such individual or to dis-
criminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges
of employment, unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification."); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A (West 2004) ("No employer shall discriminate in any way in
the payment of wages as between the sexes....").
132. Silvestris, 847 N.E.2d at 330.
133. Id. at 331.
134. Id. at 331, 336 ("[Ihe governing statute of limitations was six months.").
135. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618,645 (2007) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
136. Silvestris, 847 N.E.2d at 333-34.
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their claim with the Massachusetts agency equivalent to the EEOC
until one year later when they received a document containing spe-
cific salary information about other teachers.'37
Under reasoning similar to Ledbetter, the Silvestris court de-
clined to follow a continuing violation claim, which is usually reserved
for the hostile work environment setting, in this pay discrimination
case.' Unlike Ledbetter, however, the court in Silvestris elected to
temper the "unfairness" of a bright-line statute of limitations in this
situation "where the wrong is 'inherently unknowable"' by applying
the discovery rule. 139 The court explained that the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff to show that a reasonable person would have filed the
claim when she did. 4° The primary issue facing the court is "when
a plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of a cause of
action.""'4 Applying the discovery rule, the court held for the defen-
dant, finding that the plaintiffs should have filed their claim in 1998
when they had sufficient information to suspect discrimination from
conversations with their male coworkers. 142 Thus, the substitution
of the discovery rule for a harsher bright-line application of the stat-
ute of limitations did not disadvantage the defendant.
The equitable doctrines discussed above offer a means of tailor-
ing the judicial scrutiny of a timeliness question to the unique facts
in a pay discrimination claim, which are often fuzzy. Although the
salary setting decision is a discrete action, it is often made behind
closed doors, and co-workers do not normally compare their salaries
absent a reason to be suspicious - as in Silvestris and Ledbetter.'43
It simply does not make sense to apply a bright-line rule where the
passage of one day can change the plaintiffs right to a claim in a set-
ting where the facts are typically gray. In addition to the usefulness
of equitable doctrines, the Ledbetter decision also demands scrutiny
of the role of the EEOC's interpretations of congressional intent in
Title VII cases.
137. Id. at 335.
138. Compare Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 638-40, with Silvestris, 847 N.E.2d at 338-39.
139. Silvestris, 847 N.E.2d at 336.
140. See id. at 337.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 338.
143. See The Fair Pay Restoration Act: Ensuring Reasonable Rules in Pay Discrimi-
nation Cases, Hearing on S. 1843 Before the S. Comm. on Health, Ed., Labor, & Pensions,
110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Lilly Ledbetter) (I only started
to get some hard evidence of what men were making when someone anonymously left
a piece of paper in my mailbox at work, showing what I got paid and what three other
male managers were getting paid.").
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VIII. FORTIFYING THE ROLE OF THE EEOC
Through the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress created the
EEOC, an independent federal agency.'4 In addition to Title VII, the
EEOC oversees enforcement of the EPA, the ADEA, the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
amended Title VII.14' The dispositive issue in Ledbetter was whether
her filing with the EEOC was timely - within 180 days of the dis-
criminatory decision. 146 It is counterintuitive that the agency created
to enforce Title VII and that takes the primary pass on the facts of a
potential case of discrimination would have misinterpreted Congress's
intent. But, in fact, this is the very reason Justice Alito used to
deny deference to the EEOC's interpretation of the paycheck accrual
rule. 47 This is particularly alarming because the EEOC is statutorily
empowered by Congress to:
carry out educational and outreach activities... to - (A) indi-
viduals who historically have been victims of employment discrim-
ination and have not been equitably served by the Commission;
and (B) individuals on whose behalf the Commission has authority
to enforce any other law prohibiting employment discrimination,
concerning rights and obligations under this subchapter or such
law, as the case may be. 4"
This presents a major issue where the agency that educates possible
victims of discrimination on their rights under Title VII is offering
advice based on interpretations that the Supreme Court will overturn
without any deference (Chevron)149 or respect (Arabian).5 ' While
144. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 705(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a) (2000).
145. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Laws Enforced by the EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policylaws.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).
146. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 622 (2007), superseded
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
147. Id. at 642 n.ll ("But we have previously declined to extend Chevron deference to
the Compliance Manual, [citing Morgan] and similarly decline to defer to the EEOC's
adjudicatory positions. The EEOC's views in question are based on its misreading of
Bazemore.").
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(h)(2)(A)-(B) (2000).
149. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 838 (1984).
The argument over whether deference should be given to the EEOC's interpretation was
very much at play before the Supreme Court; Lilly Ledbetter's counsel before the Supreme
Court, Kevin K Russell, sought to appeal to Justice Scalia's propensity for finding a basis
to apply Chevron deference, shown for example in his concurring opinion in Smith v. City
of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 243-45 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring), an ADEA suit.
Kevin K. Russell, Esq., Howe & Russell, P.C., Address at the William & Mary School
of Law: Ledbetter v. Goodyear "Arguing for Pay Equality Before the Supreme Court"
(Mar. 19, 2009).
150. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991).
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Chevron deference may not be necessary, I propose that an alternative
to amending the substantive content of Title VII would be amending
§ 705 to grant more authority to the EEOC in terms of its interpre-
tations of Title VII to complement its power to educate.
A. Chevron Deference and Arabian Respect
Justice Alito supports his assertion that Chevron deference is
not required in Ledbetter by referencing footnote six in Morgan.'
Chevron deference is a high level of deference given to an agency's
statutory interpretation under certain circumstances. 15 2 While it
generally makes sense that Chevron deference was not applicable in
Ledbetter because Chevron set forth a specific framework for analyzing
whether an agency's statutory construction accords with congres-
sional intent, and, in Ledbetter, the EEOC was interpreting court-
created precedent (Bazemore), Chevron is not the only case discussing
judicial posture toward agency actions. 5 '
Justice Alito states in Ledbetter that EEOC compliance manuals
do not receive Chevron deference, and he references Morgan in support
of this point.' The referenced footnote in Morgan provides a more
substantial explanation of the level of deference due to the EEOC's
interpretations and references Arabian.5 1 In Arabian, the Supreme
Court discussed the level of deference appropriate to the EEOC:
Recognizing that "Congress, in enacting Title VII, did not confer
upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations," we
held that the level of deference afforded "'will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its rea-
soning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements,
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control."'
Because the EEOC in Arabian had changed its position on the issue
of whether Title VII applies to United States citizens working abroad,
151. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 642 n.11.
152. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-45 (detailing the deference to be given an agency's inter-
pretation of the statute it is charged with administering).
153. See id. at 842-43.
154. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 642 n.ll.
155. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 111 n.6 (2002) ("[W]e have
held that the EEOC's interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron deference. Such
interpretations are" 'entitled to respect' under our decision in Skidmore ... but only to
the extent that those interpretations have the'power to persuade.'") (citing Arabian, 499
U.S. at 257).
156. Arabian, 499 U.S. at 257 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-45
(1976)).
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under the standard set forth above, it failed the "consistency" prong
and the Court did not give any respect to the EEOC's interpretation
there.57 As a result, Congress, in finding that Arabian was wrongly
decided, passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.158 Under section 109(c)
of this legislation, the definition of "employee" under Title VII and the
ADA was expanded to include "U.S. citizens employed abroad."
159
Ultimately, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which overruledArabian
as well as a number of other Supreme Court Title VII holdings, pro-
vides a useful historic lens for viewing the reaction to Ledbetter.1
60
The dialogue that these cases generate between the Supreme Court
and Congress reveals the actual functioning of separation of powers,
but also frustrates a number of Title VII plaintiffs' rights because the
process is cumbersome and time-consuming. Because the EEOC inter-
pretation in both Ledbetter and Arabian accorded with congressional
intent more than the Supreme Court holdings in these cases, there
is evidence that strengthening the role of the EEOC by amending the
text of Title VII would permit Congress to forestall the situation where
legislation clarifying congressional intent is stalled in the Senate and
threatened by Presidential veto. I recommend that the judiciary grant
more respect to EEOC interpretations for unique cases arising under
Title VII. The principal rationale underpinning Chevron deference
after all is that the agencies "working on the ground are in a better
position to interpret policy than judges.' 61
IX. PAYCHECKS AS PROPERTY AND ON LIBERTY
Having argued that the Ledbetter holding represents an expan-
sion and reinforcement of defendants' rights within a Title VII dis-
criminatory pay setting, through defendants' now double-barreled
recourse to equitable doctrines and the extension of the Title VII filing
period to this unique claim, the critics' impression of the Ledbetter
case can be summarized in one word - imbalance.'62 The Ledbetter
opinion reposes on a statutory interpretation of Title VII that ulti-
mately limited Lilly Ledbetter's access to relief. Considering the
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idea of balance, the issues involved in Ledbetter implicate constitu-
tional questions, though only in the abstract.' It is instructive to
compare Lilly Ledbetter's position to that of her former employer in
the aftermath of the decision.
Clearly, employers are now more than protected against the
threat of stale pay discrimination claims. Over her lifetime Lilly
Ledbetter received significantly less money than she otherwise would
have because of her sex."M Even if the decision was made many years
before Ledbetter discovered the disparity, as Justice Ginsburg points
out: "the cumulative effect [of the lower paychecks over time] ... set
her pay well below that of every male area manager." 5 The Supreme
Court did not challenge the jury's factual finding in the district court
that it was "more likely than not that [Goodyear] paid [Ledbetter]
a[n] unequal salary because of her sex."' Ultimately, Lilly Ledbetter
was denied her rightful property - years of fair paychecks.
One of the most important clauses in the Constitution is the Due
Process Clause, located in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
which ensures that neither the federal government, nor the state
governments, can deny "any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law."'67 The fundamental sanctity accorded one's
property in the Due Process Clause, literally next to one's life and
liberty, is treated in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty and further con-
textualized by the concept of balancing rights. 6 '
In his discussion on individual liberty, Mill imagines a hypotheti-
cal situation where the liberty of one is pitted against the property
of another: "An opinion that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or
that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when
delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a
corndealer ... ."169 Mill explains that unjustified acts that could or
do result in harm to others must be "controlled... by the active in-
terference of mankind."'7 ° This is the outermost border of where
individual liberty may be exercised without restraint. 171 If we think
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of Ledbetter as the corndealer whose property is at risk of depriva-
tion, the need to achieve some greater balance in the law that limits
the defendant-employer's ability to avoid punishment for the discrim-
ination that harmed Ledbetter is imperative in Mill's opinion.172 Be-
cause Mill's On Liberty captures the fundamental philosophies that
have shaped the interpretation of the Constitution and the evolution
of American democracy, by using it as a frame to view the Ledbetter
case, the greater societal implications of one woman's story come
into focus.
CONCLUSION
Echoing the founders, Mill, and civil rights activists, Speaker
Nancy Pelosi, underscoring the significance of the House of Repre-
sentatives passage of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, said: "Equal
pay for equal work is a fundamental value.""7 3 Because this simple
mantra was not honored in Ledbetter, the result, as Justice Ginsburg
intimated in her dissent, is that employers have a double-barreled
defense in pay discrimination cases - equitable doctrines are a
mere backup method in the event that the facts cloud the bright-line
operation of the 180-day filing period to eliminate claims of discrim-
ination.'74 Because this leaves the adversarial parties in Title VII
actions on unbalanced ground, this Note seeks to assess the three
ways to remedy the Ledbetter outcome: legislation at the federal and
state level, more extensive application of the discovery rule, and a
re-envisioned role for the EEOC. While the legislation signed by
President Obama overruled the Ledbetter holding, the process was
a halting one, with many obstacles.'75 The discovery rule is a promis-
ing alternative because it would provide for a case-by-case analysis
of pay discrimination claims that are filed outside the period, result-
ing in a true balancing of the parties' rights. Yet the discovery rule
cannot be applied piecemeal across states - the issue must be taken
up by the Supreme Court for the doctrine to gain real credibility.
Finally, the option of granting more authority to the EEOC is also
appealing because it would enable the EEOC to operate as a channel
for discourse between the branches rather than as an impotent arm
of the legislature.
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Powerful women have spoken out on behalf of Lilly Ledbetter.
But in her own words, Lilly Ledbetter's stance is unadorned and
simple: "Goodyear may never have to pay me what it cheated me out
of. But if this bill passes, I'll have an even richer reward because I'll
know that my daughters and granddaughters, and all workers, will
get a better deal."176
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